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Ideological Exclusions: A Prior
Restraint Analysis
by DANIEL M. TORRENCE*
Introduction
During the present climate of reduced tensions between the
United States and the Soviet Union, Congress and the
Supreme Court have again had to confront the McCarran-Wal-
ter Act,' an immigration law once described as "one of the
pieces of garbage left behind by the sinking of the great scow
of McCarthyism."
'2
The McCarran-Walter Act (the Act) gives the State Depart-
ment and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
authority to deny visiting foreigners the visas required to visit
the United States.' Those failing the ideological tests required
by the Act face either a lengthy bureaucratic delay4 or exclu-
sion. This action may be based upon political beliefs, 5 alleged
* Member, Third Year Class
1. Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat.
163 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (Supp. 1986)).
2. Schapiro, The Excludables (quoting playwright Arthur Miller), MOTHER
JONES, Jan. 1986, at 32.
3. Visas are required of all visitors except those from Canada and Mexico.
Kalven, U.S. Visa Policy: The Machinery of Exclusion, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS,
May 1987, at 26.
4. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-475, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 163 (1987).
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) reads:
Except as otherwise provided. .. the following classes of aliens... shall be
excluded from admission into the United States: ... (28) Aliens who are, or
at any time have been, members of any of the following classes:
(A) Aliens who are anarchists;
(B) Aliens who advocate or teach, or who are members of or affiliated
with any organization that advocates or teaches, opposition to all organized
government;
(C) Aliens who are members of or affiliated with... the Communist or
any other totalitarian party... ;
(D) Aliens ... who advocate the economic, international, and governmen-
tal doctrines of world communism... ;
(G) Aliens who write or publish . . . or who knowingly circulate, dis-
tribute, print, or display... or who knowingly have in their possession for
the purpose of circulation, publication, distribution, or display .... matter
advocating or teaching opposition to all organized government ....
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ties with Communist organizations 6 or the individual's impact
in the United States on "the public interest."7
A major step towards the repeal of these provisions was
taken on December 17, 1987, when President Reagan signed
into law a fourteen-month suspension of all alien exclusions
and deportations based on beliefs, statements, or associations.'
This suspension was recently extended for two years, thereby
including applications for non-immigrant visas submitted
before January 1, 1991.9 This two-year extension, like the ear-
lier suspension, will automatically expire unless both houses
of Congress vote to make a permanent change in the law.10
Noting this, one major newspaper characterized the extension
as a "half step toward free speech."'"
Should the suspension be allowed to expire, there are strong
indications that the Supreme Court would not strike down the
revived exclusionary provisions or any other laws permitting
similar politically motivated exclusions.' 2
While the temporary suspension postponed debate on the
merits of ideological exclusions, a recent Supreme Court deci-
sion provided no guidance on the constitutional issues raised.
Reagan v. Abourezk,13 the first case of the Supreme Court's
1987 term, dealt with subsection 27 of the Act. It mandates
that a visiting foreigner must be denied entry if State Depart-
ment officials believe his activities in the U.S. would prejudice
6. Id.
7. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27) mandates the exclusion of "[a]liens who the consular
officer or the Attorney General knows or has reason to believe seek to enter the
United States solely, principally, or incidentally to engage in activities which would
be prejudicial to the public interest, or endanger the welfare, safety, or security of
the United States."
8. Between January 1, 1988, and January 1, 1991, no alien may be
denied a visa or excluded from admission into the United States, subject to
restrictions or conditions on entry into the United States, or subject to de-
portation because of any past, current, or expected beliefs, statements, or
associations which, if engaged in by a United States citizen in the United
States, would be protected under the Constitution of the United States.
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, as amended, Pub.
L. No. 100-461, § 555, 102 Stats. 2268-36, -37 (1988).
9. H.R. 4637, Pub. L. 100-461, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. S. 13789,
Sept. 26, 1988.
10. Id.; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-475, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1987).
11. A Half Step Toward Free Speech, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1988, at 28, col. 1.
12. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
13. 108 S. Ct. 252 (1987), aff'g by an equally divided Court 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C.
Cir. 1986).
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the public interest. 4 The Supreme Court upheld,15 by a 3-3
split, a federal court of appeals decision allowing foreign policy
concerns to rank as one of the public interests the law is
meant to protect.'6 The issue of whether an alien's mere pres-
ence in the United States could be considered an activity, thus
allowing exclusion, was remanded for the district court's
determination. 7
Therefore, if the present suspension of ideological exclu-
sions is allowed to lapse in 1989 and the Abourezk standard is
applied, individuals may be excluded whenever the State De-
partment determines that foreign policy so requires. This un-
certain standard will allow the shifting winds of international
politics and State Department "signal sending""' to determine
the ability of citizens to receive critical information and opin-
ions concerning our relations with foreign countries. It is in-
tolerable that the federal government should have the power
to thus regulate the speakers available to the American peo-
ple. For the Founding Fathers, "[t]he dominant purpose of the
First Amendment was to prohibit the widespread practice of
governmental suppression of embarrassing information."'"
Furthermore, because restrictive immigration laws histori-
cally are enacted in times of crisis,2" the current era of
friendly U.S.-Soviet relations is no guarantee that such stat-
utes are a thing of the past. Thus, it is vital that citizens and
legislators be familiar with the McCarran-Walter Act.
This Note looks at the nature of the information suppressed
in past ideological exclusion cases and finds it often deserving
of the utmost protection by the first amendment. 21 It exam-
14. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27) (1982).
15. 108 S. Ct. 252 (1987).
16. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1986), qff'd mem., 108 S.
Ct. 252 (1987).
17. 785 F.2d at 1053.
18. "[T]he denial of visas to foreign government officials is one of the tools avail-
able to a government to communicate its attitude about the policies of other states."
785 F.2d at 1076 (Bork, J., dissenting) (quoting affidavit of Under Secretary of State
Eagleburger).
19. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 723 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
20. See Nafziger, The General Admission of Aliens Under International Law, 77
AM. J. INT'L L. 804, 816 (1983); see also Eisler, First Amendment and the Alien Ex-
clusion Power-What Standard of Review?, 4 CARDozo L. REV. 457 (1983).
21. E.g. "[P]olitical speech is entitled to the fullest possible measure of constitu-
tional protection .... ." City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 816
(1984).
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ines the factors used by the Court in balancing free speech and
governmental interests and then compares the Act's restric-
tion of speech with a line of first amendment cases not previ-
ously considered in the context of ideological exclusions. The
Note concludes that the Act is effectively an administrative li-
censing system, that the Act leaves inadequate alternative
modes of communication, and that the Act unconstitutionally
restricts the receipt of information and ideas by American
citizens. Apart from any action Congress may take to perma-
nently reform the immigration laws by abolishing exclusion-
ary provisions based on beliefs, statements and associations,
the Supreme Court should recognize such laws as nothing less
than thought control and find them void on their face.
I
Exclusionary Subsections of the McCarran-
Walter Act 22
A. Historical Perspective
Exclusionary immigration laws have been adopted on an ad
hoc basis since the late 19th century. 3 Often passed in re-
sponse to a crisis or some perceived threat to the nation,24 such
laws often reflected "nativism, racial prejudice, and ideological
repugnance."" The first compilation of federal exclusion laws
was the Internal Security Act of 1950.26 When Congress codi-
fied and amended all existing immigration laws in the Immi-
gration and Naturalization (McCarran-Walter) Act of 1952,27
exclusionary provisions were considered necessary because
"[c]riminals, Communists and subversives are even now gain-
ing admission into this country like water through a sieve. "28
The severity of the exclusionary provisions prompted Presi-
22. The author recognizes the need for the government's control over
immigration when health, safety or national security issues are concerned.
References in this Note arguing the unconstitutionality of the Act are directed only
toward those subsections allowing for exclusions based on ideological or political
(including foreign policy) grounds.
23. 408 U.S. 753, 761 (1971). See also Nafziger, supra note 20, at 816.
24. See Eisler, supra note 20 at 462-63.
25. Nafziger, supra note 20, at 824.
26. Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987 (1950).
27. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (Supp. 1986) (as amended by Immigration and National-
ity (McCarran-Walter) Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163).
28. Margolick, Reprise on McCarran Act, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1982, at B1, col. 5
(quoting the Act's sponsor, Senator Patrick McCarran).
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dent Truman's veto,29 which was narrowly overridden in the
Senate.
B. Subsections 27 and 28
The thirty-three exclusions listed in the Act are a concise
historical catalogue of the nation's fears of the evils that for-
eigners might bring to the United States. Anarchists,30 the in-
sane,31 drug addicts,32 professional beggars,33 polygamists,34
skilled or unskilled laborers, 35  prostitutes,36  and former
Nazis37 are all unwelcome. This Note focuses on the two sub-
sections of the McCarran-Walter Act that expressly or by con-
struction allow for ideological or political exclusions:
subsections 27 and 28.38
Subsection 27, while facially aimed only at activities, is
broad and vaguely worded. It requires the exclusion of for-
eigners who "the consular officer or the Attorney General
knows or has reason to believe seek to enter the United States
solely, principally, or incidentally to engage in activities which
would be prejudicial to the public interest .. .
Subsection 28 is overtly ideological and anti-communist. It
allows for the exclusion of aliens who have been anarchists or
Communists, those who "advocate or teach, or who are mem-
29. Regarding the Act, Truman said: "Seldom has a bill exhibited the distrust
evidenced here for citizens and aliens alike." Truman, Veto of Bill to Revise the
Laws Relating to Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality, PUB. PAPERS, 441,
444 (1952-1953).
30. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(A) (1982).
31. I& at § 1182(a)(2).
32. Id, at § 1182(a)(5).
33. Id. at § 1182(a)(8).
34. Id. at § 1182(a)(11).
35. "[U]nless... there are not sufficient workers.., and.., the employment of
such aliens will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of the work-
ers in the United States similarly employed." Id. at § 1182(a)(14).
36. Id. at § 1182(a)(12).
37. Id. at § 1182(a)(33).
38. 8 U.S.C § 1182(a)(27), (28). The language of two additional subsections, sec-
tion 1182(a)(11) and (29), allows for exclusion based expressly or impliedly on ideo-
logical grounds. Section 1182(a)(11) mandates the exclusion of aliens who "are
polygamists... or advocate the practice of polygamy." section 1182(a)(29) calls for
the exclusion of aliens who "probably would, after entry ... join, affiliate with, or
participate in the activities of any organization ... registered under section 786 of
Title 50."
Use of these exclusions, however, is extremely infrequent, and will not be dealt
with in this Note.
39. Id. at § 1182(a)(27).
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bers of or affiliated with" such groups, and those who write or
publish or have in their possession for the purpose of publica-
tion "any written or printed matter, advocating or teaching op-
position to all organized government. '40
Ideological exclusions have been used against foreign politi-
cians, 41 artists,42 and activists43 who have been invited to the
United States to meet with citizens. Several commentators
and legal scholars charge that the first amendment is violated
when the Act is used to silence critics of administration
policy. 44
Most of the exclusionary subsections of the Act are not com-
plete bars to entry. The Act allows for waivers to be given to
non-immigrants in the Attorney General's discretion for all
but three of the listed reasons for exclusion.45 The three non-
waivable exclusions are subsection 29, which excludes spies
and saboteurs;46 subsection 33, which excludes perpetrators of
World War II Nazi persecutions; 47 and subsection 27, which in-
cludes, among other things, aliens engaging in activities "prej-
40. Id. at § 1182(a)(28).
41. Among those excluded have been: Ricardo Alarcon, former Foreign Rela-
tions Minister of Cuba; Roberto D'Aubuisson, President of El Salvador's Constituent
Assembly; Sam Nujoma, President of the South West African People's Organization;
and Ian Smith, former Prime Minister of Rhodesia. Kalven, supra note 3, at 27;
Schapiro, supra note 2, at 30; Bearers of Dangerous Ideas, HARPER'S, July 1987, at 23.
42. Among those excluded have been: Dennis Brutus, South African poet; Dario
Fo, Italian playwright; Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Nobel Prize-winning Colombian
novelist; Yves Montand, French singer and actor; and Farley Mowat, Canadian au-
thor. Kalven, supra note 3, at 27; Schapiro, supra note 2, at 30; Bearers of Dangerous
Ideas, supra note 41, at 23.
43. Among those excluded have been: Hortensia De Allende, Chilean human
rights activist; Owen Carron, IRA leader; Nino Pasti, former NATO general; Ruben
Zamora, Salvadoran opposition leader; and 320 Japanese delegates to the June 1982
United Nations special session on disarmament. Kalven, supra note 3, at 27;
Schapiro, supra note 2, at 30; Bearers of Dangerous Ideas, supra note 41, at 23.
44. See generally Shapiro, Ideological Exclusions: Closing the Border to Political
Dissidents, 100 HARV. L. REV. 930, 934 (1987) ("[T]he ideological exclusion provisions
of the McCarran-Walter Act respond to a variety of impulses . . . [that] can be
described as petty, punitive, and political."); Voight, Visa Denials on Ideological
Grounds and the First Amendment Right to Receive Information: The Case for
Stricter Judicial Scrutiny, 17 CUMB. L. REV. 139, 161 (1984) ("The visa denial situa-
tion clearly violates the prior restraint doctrine."); Hahn, Constitutional Limits on
the Power to Exclude Aliens, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 957, 997 (1982) ("The Court's analy-
sis of the government's power to exclude has not kept pace, however, and continues
to reflect the anachronistic theory that the power is an absolute one imposed upon
individuals unprotected by the Constitution.").
45. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3) (1982).
46. Id. at § 1182(a)(29).
47. Id. at § 1182(a)(33).
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udicial to the public interest."4 Because subsection 27 is non-
waivable, it is critical that discretionary abuses under this sub-
section be subject to judicial review.
Practical necessity dictates that subsection 28 visa denials be
waivable by the State Department. Otherwise, thousands of
yearly visitors, including diplomats, teachers, tourists, and stu-
dents with ties to Communist organizations, would be denied
entry. However, the availability of waivers will not necessar-
ily insure unfettered exercise of citizens' right to receive infor-
mation. This is because "in many cases the frustration,
unpredictability, and expense of bureaucratic delay have
caused applicants either to withdraw their applications in dis-
gust or to miss the very conference they wished to attend."49
C. The McGovern Amendment
A desire to comply with the spirit of the 1975 Helsinki
Human Rights Accords 0 led to the 1977 McGovern Amend-
ment. 1 The amendment gives Congress some supervision over
subsection 28 exclusions, which require that visa denials be
waived within thirty days unless the government certifies to
Congress that the alien represents a security threat to the
United States.52
The McGovern Amendment waivers do not, however, apply
to subsection 27. Thus, anyone whose activities in the United
States are considered by the State Department to be even inci-
dentally prejudicial to the public interest may be excluded.5 3
This decision, when applied to an alien abroad, is not subject
to review.5 4 The nonwaivable subsection 27 exclusions often
48. Id. at § 1182(a)(29).
49. Englander, Visa Denials on Ideological Grounds: An Update, 8 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 249, 258 (1985).
50. See Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act, 14 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 1292 (1975).
51. 22 U.S.C. § 2691 (1977).
52. Id. INS records show that the percentage of subsection 28 waiver requests
that are denied has remained at around two percent over the last twelve years with
one exception: Fiscal Year 1978-the year including the Soviet Union's invasion of
Afghanistan-in which the huge leap in the percentage of waivers denied (to twenty-
four percent) suggests that the quality of U.S.-Soviet relations at a given time may
influence these decisions. See BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
PUB. No. 9386, REPORT OF THE VISA OFFICE 1978, 105 (1985).
53. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(A) (1982).
54. Id. at § 1226. This section does, however, allow for a hearing for foreigners
who are denied entry after having reached the United States, except in national se-
1989]
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J.
have been made for foreign policy reasons which are "very
easy to hide behind as almost every exclusion can be theoreti-
cally linked to an area of international concern or attention. 55
In October 1983, the State Department proposed, unsuccess-
fully, to codify a "foreign policy factors" exception to the Mc-
Govern Amendment.m This failure undoubtedly pleased
proponents of the Act's liberalization, who suggest that for-
eign policy concerns are one of the loopholes to be guarded
against in any permanent rewriting of the law.57 Whatever
the merits of any particular exclusion under this subsection,
INS records show that subsection 27 exclusions, not being sub-
ject to the McGovern Amendment, rarely are overcome. 5
Perhaps as important as the measurable refusals and waiver
denials is the immeasurable number of foreigners who do not
visit the United States because of the "indignity of answering
embarrassing questions about their political or personal activi-
ties.159 As early as 1952, it was reported that many scientists
abroad were declining invitations to visit the United States be-
cause the requirement of a waiver would "imply an acknowl-
edgement of their guilt."' The editors of The Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists stated that the McCarran-Walter Act was
"hurting the continuing advance of American science and
learning, and harmful to our prestige abroad. '61
curity and physical and mental defect cases. See id. at § 1225(c); id at § 1182(a)(l)-
(6).
55. Slovinski, Banned in the U.S.A., 13 A.B.A. SEC. INDIVIDUAL RTS. & RESPS.
16, 42 (1986).
56. S. 2033, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1983).
57. Greenhouse, The Law on Excludable Aliens: Stay Tuned, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1,
1988, at 6, col. 1.
58. Of the 223 preliminary visa refusals under subsection 27 made in fiscal years
1976-1984, only 7 were overcome. See BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, PUB. No. 8926, REPORT OF THE VISA OFFICE 1976, 76 (1977); BUREAU OF CON-
SULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. '8926A, REPORT OF THE VISA OFFICE
1976 (Supp. 1977), and Table 22 (Supp. 1977); BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 9386, REPORT OF THE VISA OFFICE 1978, 105 (1985); BU-
REAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 9444, REPORT OF THE
VISA OFFICE 1980, 104 (1985); BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
PUB. No. 9419, REPORT OF THE VISA OFFICE 1983, 87 (1985); BUREAU OF CONSULAR
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 9455, REPORT OF THE VISA OFFICE 1984, 95
(1986).
59. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-475, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 163 (1987).
60. BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Oct. 1952, at 210 (statement of Special Editor Ed-
ward Shils).
61. Id.
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II
The Constitutionality of the Act
The Constitution gives few, if any, rights to aliens who
reach our shores but are denied entry.62 Thus, aliens have no
standing to contest non-immigrant (visitor) visa denial deci-
63hsions. Often, however, American citizens invite foreigners to
the United States to give speeches, attend conferences or sym-
posia, or meet in other ways with citizens to exchange ideas
and information. When this occurs, citizens' first amendment
rights are implicated64 and these rights exist without regard to
the alien's right, or lack thereof, to enter the United States.65
A. Kleindienst v. Mandel
The right to receive information is not in the text of the
Constitution, but "[i]t is now well established that the Consti-
tution protects the right to receive information and ideas.16 6
This right was recognized in Kleindienst v. Mandel,6 7 the only
Supreme Court opinion to address the first amendment's im-
pact upon the government's ability to exclude foreigners.
Mandel arose when the United States Attorney General re-
fused to grant a temporary visa to Dr. Ernest Mandel, a re-
nowned Belgian journalist and Marxian theoretician. Dr.
Mandel was excludable under subsection 28 for having advo-
cated and published "the doctrines of world communism. '6 8
Unfortunately, in addressing citizens' rights to receive infor-
mation from sources such as Dr. Mandel, the Court engages in
doublethink.6 9  The Court found that "First Amendment
62. "Although aliens seeking entry are currently assured a hearing and permit-
ted the assistance of counsel by statute, the Court has never repudiated the harsh
and frequently criticized assertion in Knauff that aliens seeking entry are given no
constitutional quarter." Hahn, supra note 44, at 962-63. "[I]t is not within the prov-
ince of any court, unless expressly authorized by law, to review the determination of
the political branch of the Government to exclude a given alien." United States ex
rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950).
63. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972).
64. Id at 765.
65. Id at 762.
66. Id. (quoting Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1941)).
67. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
68. I& at 757.
69. Doublethink (coined by George Orwell) is "(t)he mental capacity to accept as
equally valid two entirely contrary opinions or beliefs." OXFORD ENGLISH DICTION-
ARY, Compact Edition, Supplement, Vol. III, 213 (1st ed. 1987).
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rights are implicated,"7 and yet simultaneously held that it
was unnecessary to balance first amendment rights against
governmental regulatory interests.7' Previously, the Court
had stated that a restriction on first amendment rights is justi-
fied only with regard to "certain well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, '72 including "fighting words, ' 73 ob-
scenity,74 libel,75 and speech likely to produce "imminent law-
less action. '7' Dr. Mandel, on the other hand, was barred
from presenting lectures on technology and economics at Stan-
ford, Princeton, Amherst, and Vassar.77
Instead of focusing on the Act's restriction of protected
speech, the Court in Mandel approvingly cited two of the ear-
liest immigration cases, The Chinese Exclusion Case78 and
Fong Yue Ting v. United States,79 as support for the argument
that the power to exclude aliens is "inherent in sovereignty,
[and] necessary for maintaining normal international relations
and defending the country against foreign encroachments and
dangers-a power to be exercised exclusively by the political
branches of government."80 However, as the two dissents in
Mandel point out, these early decisions clearly permit only
the exclusion of aliens "whose presence is deemed injurious or
a source of danger to the country."'" Even if the Mandel
Court's reading of Chinese Exclusion and Fong are accepted,
these cases are clearly distinguishable because they did not in-
volve the constitutional rights of citizens. If they had, the
Court would have been "required by the paramount law of the
Constitution to intervene.8 s2
Preferring to consider only the government's power to ex-
clude aliens, the Mandel majority saw "dangers and undesir-
ability" s in weighing citizens' rights to receive information.
70. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 765.
71. Id.
72. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
73. Id.
74. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
75. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 256 (1952).
76. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
77. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 756-57.
78. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
79. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
80. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 765 (quoting Brief for Appellants at 20).
81. Chinese Exclusion, 130 U.S. at 608.
82. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 713.
83. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 769.
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Yet, as Justice Marshall's dissent pointed out, it is the Court's
"delicate and difficult task" to weigh such interests when a
Bill of Rights freedom is restricted. 4
Instead, the majority held that the State Department need
only have a "facially legitimate and bona fide" reason for any
alien exclusion. If such a reason can be found, the courts need
not look behind the discretionary power nor weigh citizens'
first amendment interests.8 5
Not all exclusions are based upon the alien's political affilia-
tions. The Act is also used to prevent the entry of foreigners
in order to exclude political speech critical of the federal gov-
ernment. 86 These aliens may be officials of governments hos-
tile to the United States or widely-known activists or artists.
In the case of foreign government officials, the government
has justified such actions by saying that "the issuance or de-
nial [of a non-immigrant visa] is construed [by foreign govern-
ments] as an act of the United States Government",7 and "can
have significant diplomatic or foreign policy ramifications."88
As noted ifr7a, 9 this is a self-justifying system. More impor-
tantly, citizens' first amendment rights are not inferior to
"foreign policy ramifications." If critical statements by for-
eigners to United States citizens are embarrassing to our gov-
ernment, it is worth recalling that "the First Amendment was
adopted against the widespread use of the common law of sedi-
tious libel to punish the dissemination of material that is em-
barrassing to the powers-that-be."90
Lower federal courts have been sensitive to similar ques-
tionable exclusions in the few cases that have applied the
Mandel test. As these cases show, difficulty in applying the
"legitimate and bona fide" standard arises when courts rule
that the desire to suppress critics of administration policy is
84. Id at 782 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Robel, 389 U.S.
258, 264 (1967)).
85. Id at 770.
86. Howe, U.S. Denials of Visas Over Politics of Foreigners: The Battle is Heat-
ing Up, N.Y. Times, July 28, 1985, at A7, col. 6.
87. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting affidavit of Under-Secretary of State Eagleburger), off'd mem, 108 S.
Ct. 252 (1987).
88. Id
89. See infra text accompanying notes 304-06.
90. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 723 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
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not a legitimate purpose when first amendment rights are at
stake-thereby conducting the very weighing of interests
which the Mandel test was designed to avoid.91
B. Interpreting the "Legitimate and Bona Fide" Test
In Allende v. Shultz,92 a federal district court applying the
Mandel test ruled that an alien invited to the United States
may not be excluded under subsection 27 solely on the content
of his or her proposed message.9" In Harvard Law School Fo-
rum v. Shultz,94 the same court held that the visa denial at
issue was "not facially legitimate because it [was] related to
the suppression of protected political discussion. '' The court
went further, weighing not only the citizen-plaintiffs' rights,
but also the public interest in "preserving free and open de-
bate" on sensitive political issues.96
1. Abourezk v. Reagan
Most recently, the Supreme Court upheld, by a 3-3 split, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals decision in Abourezk v.
Reagan.97 Because the Court of Appeals reached its decision
by statutory construction without considering the appellants'-
constitutional questions,98 the issue of when and how to weigh
citizens' first amendment rights against the government's
power to exclude was not addressed.
The Abourezk court considered whether Congress intended
that when an alien is excludable due to an affiliation pro-
scribed by the usually waivable subsection 28, the government
should be free to exclude the alien under non-waivable subsec-
tion 27 without an independent reason. Generally, when the
government seeks to exclude a foreigner because of political
affiliation, subsection 28 will be used because it details the ex-
cludable advocacies, activities and affiliations. However, the
McGovern Amendment,99 which applies only to subsection 28,
91. See Harvard Law School Forum v. Shultz, 633 F. Supp. 525 (D. Mass. 1986);
Allende v. Shultz, 605 F. Supp. 1220 (D. Mass. 1985).
92. 605 F. Supp 1220 (D. Mass 1985).
93. Id. at 1225.
94. 633 F. Supp. 525 (D. Mass. 1986).
95. Id. at 531.
96. Id,
97. 785 F.2d 1043, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1986), qjf'd mem., 108 S. Ct. 252 (1987).
98. Id. at 1052.
99. 22 U.S.C. § 2691 (1977).
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calls for admission unless the alien poses a threat to national
security.1°° Abourezk held that the government should not be
able to ignore the spirit of the McGovern Amendment by us-
ing subsection 27 instead of, or in addition to, subsection 28,
without additional reasons."' 1 Thus, membership in a pro-
scribed organization is not, by itself, reason enough to exclude
an alien under the language of subsection 27, unless an in-
dependent threat to the public interest, welfare, safety, or se-
curity is shown.10 2  To exclude under the non-waivable
subsection 27, the State Department must provide "criteria...
clear enough to allow the courts to fulfill their responsibility
to ensure that the executive authority respects congressional
intent." However, "the precise contours of the 'independence
inquiry'" are left to the judgment of the State Department.1 0 3
The court also held that foreign policy concerns rank among
the national interests, protection of which justifies exclusion
of aliens seeking entry to engage in activities prejudicial to the
public interest.1°4 In support, the court noted "[t]he broad lan-
guage of [subsection] 27 evinces no intent to restrict the kinds
of governmental concerns that would qualify" as justifying ex-
clusion. The court also stated, without authority, that "the re-
ality of our late twentieth century" demands that public
interest and national welfare be considered at least partly de-
pendent upon "the effective execution 'of our foreign pol-
icy. ''P10 Such an assertion without further guidelines merely
begs the vital questions: what is necessary for effective execu-
tion of our foreign policy, and who shall decide?
III
The Proper Balance
A. Introduction
Both the Abourezk "effective execution of foreign policy"
test and the Mandel "legitimate and bona fide" test are diffi-
cult to apply. Despite the recognition that citizens are "sub-
100. Id. at § 2691(a).
101. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1057.
102. Id, at 1043-44.
103. Id. at 1060.
104. Id. at 1053.
105. Id
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stantively interested in, and adversely affected by"'1 6
ideological exclusions, and that "First Amendment rights are
implicated,'" 107 neither decision acknowledges the need for the
weighing of constitutional rights in visa denial cases.
The search for a proper balance between first amendment
rights and the government's power to restrict speech-related
conduct must recognize "that each medium for communicating
ideas and information presents its own particular problems."' 0 8
Both the content and context of speech should be consid-
ered.10 9 When government action significantly restricts first
amendment freedom, the general balancing test provides that
if speech-related activity is protected by the Constitution, any
significant restriction upon such activity must be struck down
unless (1) the government has a substantial or important in-
terest in the restriction, and (2) the restriction is no greater
than necessary to further the government's objective. 10 This
two-part test applies when the restriction is "content-neutral,"
meaning that the motive and effect of the law are "unrelated
to the suppression of free expression.""' However, if the re-
striction is designed to suppress expression, or specific lawful
expression ("content-based"), the government has a higher
burden: it must prove there is a compelling interest at stake,
as well as meet the least restrictive means test."-
In applying these tests, the Supreme Court gives a number
of factors special attention: the method of the machinery of
restriction;"' whether the law's effect is to burden a particular
mode of expression"14 or point of view;" 5 whether the lan-
guage of the law is such that it should be found void for vague-
106. Id at 1051.
107. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972).
108. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 818 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
109. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Carey v. Brown,
447 U.S. 455, 484 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
110. Vincent, 466 U.S. at 821 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
111. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); Vincent, 466 U.S. at 805.
112. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'r, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1979);
Board of Educ., Island Trees, Etc. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 877 (1982).
113. "The issue is not whether the government may impose a particular restric-
tion of substance in an area of public expression ... but whether it may do so by a
particular method .... Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 648 (1958).
114. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
115. Vincent, 466 U.S. at 804.
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ness116 or overbreadth;1 7 and whether the restriction leaves
adequate remaining modes of communication."' Before con-
sidering these factors, it must be established that citizens' first
amendment rights are in fact restricted by the delayed or de-
nied issuance of non-immigrant visas when citizens desire to
receive information or ideas from those excluded.
B. The Right to Receive Information from Aliens
The right to receive information had its birthplace under
the fourteenth amendment." 9 In a series of cases in the
1920's, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the
right of students to contract with teachers came within the
meaning of "liberty" guaranteed by the fourteenth amend-
ment. 120  In Meyer v. Nebraska,'21 the Court found the four-
teenth amendment guarantee of liberty included "the right...
to acquire useful knowledge."' 22 In 1927, Justice Brandeis'
concurring opinion in Whitney v. California123 set forth the
following two rationales for a general "right to receive
information.' 1 24
First, the right of free speech guaranteed by the first
amendment is meaningless without the right to be free to re-
ceive it. 25 This subsequently has been held to mean, for ex-
116. "The general test of vagueness applies with particular force in review of laws
dealing with speech." Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1975).
117. "Where ... a statute imposes a direct restriction on protected First Amend-
ment activity, and where the defect in the statute is that the means chosen to accom-
plish the State's objectives are too imprecise, so that in all its applications the statute
creates an unnecessary risk of chilling free speech, the statute is properly subject to
facial attack." Secretary of State of Md. v. J.H. Munson, 467 U.S. 947, 967 (1983).
118. "[A] restriction on expressive activity may be invalid if the remaining modes
of communication are inadequate." Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812.
119. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
120. See Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927) (law limiting operation of
foreign language schools violates constitutional guaranty of "liberty"); Pierce v. Soci-
ety of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right to receive education from a private
rather than public teacher); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 667 (1925) (right to
receive information, but not including the advocacy of overthrowing the
government).
121. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
122. Id. at 399.
123. 274 U.S. 357 (1927). The case was decided on jurisdictional grounds and the
issue of a right to learn was not specifically decided.
124. For a recent reference to the right to receive information, see Board of
Educ., Island Trees, Etc. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982).
125. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375.
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ample, that the right to distribute literature "necessarily
protects the right to receive it,"'1 26 and that the right to receive
"is an inherent corollary of the rights of free speech and
press. "127 Far from being secondary to the right to speak, the
rights of receivers (including the right to possess what one has
received) may be greater than the rights of senders in certain
circumstances. For example, Stanley v. Georgia 128 upheld the
right of private possession of obscene material, though its dis-
tribution would have been illegal.129 In Stanley, the Court re-
iterated its position that the right to receive applies to
"information and ideas, regardless of their social worth.' 3 0
Second, and "[more importantly, the right to receive ideas
is a necessary predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise
of his own rights of speech, press, and political freedom.' 131
This exercise is vital because "the Constitution presupposes
the existence of an informed citizenry prepared to participate
in governmental affairs.' 3 2
This second justification for a right to receive is a required
link in the argument against ideological exclusions. Because
the Constitution does not give entering aliens first amendment
protection,13 3 courts must recognize an independent right of
citizens to receive information and ideas from aliens in order
to provide standing from which to challenge the government's
actions. 34  The government in Mandel sought to downplay
such an independent right by making two arguments. First,
the government contended that the exclusion of aliens does
not involve a restriction of first amendment freedoms because
the only restriction is upon "action-the action of the alien in
coming into this country.' 1 5 Answering this claim, the Court
stated that "[i]n light of the Court's previous decisions con-
cerning the 'right to receive information,' we cannot realisti-
cally say that the problem facing us disappears entirely or is
126. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
127. Pico, 457 U.S. at 867.
128. 394 U.S. 557 (1968).
129. Id. at 565.
130. Id. at 564.
131. Pico, 457 U.S. at 867.
132. Id. at 876.
133. United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292 (1904); United
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessey, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950); Galvan v. Press, 347
U.S. 522, 530-32 (1954).
134. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972).
135. Id. at 764 (quoting Brief for Appellants at 29).
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nonexistent because the mode of regulation bears directly on
physical movement.' 1 36 Second, the government noted that
the restriction was not total: free access to Dr. Mandel's ideas
was available through his books and via the telephone. 37 The
Court responded that "[t]his argument overlooks what may be
particular qualities inherent in sustained, face-to-face debate,
discussion and questioning. 1 38  Thus, the Court discounted
both arguments against finding a right to receive information
from aliens, and recognized "that First Amendment rights are
implicated.' ' 39 Only the Court's questionable finding that a
balancing of first amendment rights is unnecessary prevented
it from confronting its prior right to receive decisions. The
logical inconsistency of the Court's stated standard of review
necessitates a re-evaluation; it must be recognized that first
amendment rights should be balanced in ideological exclusion
cases, and that the right to receive information must be
weighed with its traditional force.
C. Content-Based or Content-Neutral?
Although the Supreme Court has often held that the first
amendment prevents the government from restricting expres-
sion "because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content,'' 40 this has never been literally true. 41 The Court
has found whole classes of speech deserving of only dimin-
ished constitutional protection 42 or denied such protection al-
136. Id. at 764.
137. Id at 765.
138. Id,
139. I&
140. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1971); see also City Council
v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); Street v. New
York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70
(1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444-45 (1963); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337
U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
141. The Supreme Court's first case weighing the strength of the first amend-
ment found the issue to be "whether the words used are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
142. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980) (commercial speech); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50
(1976) (zoning ordinances directed at adult movie theaters); Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (attorney advertising); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
396 U.S. 375 (1970) (corporate proxy statements); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395
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together based on the content of the speech.143 Within any
class of protected speech, however, "there are some purported
interests-such as a desire to suppress support for a minority
party or an unpopular cause, or to exclude the expression of
certain points of view from the marketplace of ideas-that are
so plainly illegitimate" that even a "significant and legitimate
state interest" will not sustain their restriction.'" This is the
requirement of content neutrality. The essence of the rule is
"the need for absolute neutrality by the government; its regu-
lation of communication may not be affected by sympathy or
hostility for the point of view being expressed by the commu-
nicator.' 45 When this principle is violated, the statute should
be struck down as being impermissibly content-based. The
government, for example, may not pass a regulation that re-
stricts all forms of picketing except that which deals with la-
bor disputes, 46 nor may it refuse to grant a permit to
Jehovah's Witnesses to speak in a city park when other polit-
ical and religious groups are allowed to use the park for simi-
lar purposes. 47 Similarly, the Court has struck down a law
that banned all displays of symbols of opposition to organized
government 4 and a New York Public Service Commission or-
der that prohibited only those monthly bill enclosures which
discussed public policy issues. 49
Therefore, in evaluating content-based restrictions, the de-
terminative question is "not whether there is some differentia-
tion on the basis of content, but whether the .. . prohibited
conduct can be said to share the same characteristics as the
conduct which is permitted."'" In other words, a regulation is
unconstitutionally content-based if, out of a protected class of
speech, it singles out a certain idea or message and seeks to
U.S. 575 (1969) (employers' threats of retaliation for the labor activities of
employees).
143. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (libel); Miller v. Califor-
nia, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)
(fighting words); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (non-obscene child
pornography).
144. Vincent, 466 U.S. at 804.
145. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 67.
146. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1971); Carey v. Brown, 447
U.S. 455 (1980).
147. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1950).
148. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
149. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'r, 447 U.S. 530 (1979).
150. Carey, 447 U.S. at 484 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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"regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas
at the expense of others."''
Subsection 27 of the Act demands exclusion of aliens whose
"activities... would be prejudicial to the public interest.' '15 2 It
is not facially aimed at the content of aliens' expected speech,
however, as applied, the subsection has been put to uses that
clearly are intended to prevent citizens from receiving certain
ideas. The 1983 exclusion of Nino Pasti is one example. Pasti,
a retired member of the Italian Senate and a four-star general
of the Italian Air Force, is widely regarded as an expert on
nuclear weapons. As Vice-Supreme Allied Commander of
NATO for Nuclear Affairs, he was stationed at the Pentagon
from 1966 to 1969. He had obtained visas to visit the United
States five times before 1983. In September 1983, Pasti was
invited to speak at a Boston disarmament rally to oppose
cruise missile deployment in Europe. His visa was denied on
this occasion, however, because his presence in the United
States "would have been prejudicial to the conduct of foreign
affairs." 5 3
The ability of subsection 27 to restrict the content of the
ideas citizens receive stems from the vagueness of the word-
ing, coupled with the broad purpose of the Act.M As previ-
ously noted,5 5 the federal court in Allende v. Shultz 56 held
that "an alien invited to impart information and ideas to
American citizens ... may not be excluded under subsection
27 solely on account of the content of his proposed
message."' 57  The district court in Abourezk v. Reagan 58
reached the same conclusion: "although the government may
deny entry to aliens altogether, or for any number of specific
reasons, it may not, consistent with the First Amendment,
deny entry solely on account of the content of speech. 1 159 Be-
cause the court of appeals did not reach this constitutional
question,6 ° the Supreme Court's affirmance of Abourezk does
151. Vincent, 466 U.S. at 804.
152. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27) (1982).
153. See supra note 42; see also Shapiro, supra note 44.
154. See supra text accompanying note 39.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
156. 605 F. Supp. 1220 (D. Mass. 1985).
157. Id, at 1225.
158. 592 F. Supp. 880 (D.D.C. 1984).
159. I& at 887.
160. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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not address the content-based restrictions subsection 27 im-
poses on the first amendment freedom to receive information.
Subsection 28, on the other hand, is directly aimed at the
political beliefs of aliens. 16 1 Foreigners are excludable for
even slight past or present affiliations with communist or an-
archical organizations. 6 2 Although waivers for this provision
are usually given, in 1985, alone, 815 foreigners were denied
subsection 28 waivers, and were thus completely barred from
the United States.16 Because the restrictions are based upon
the political views of the sender, they necessarily reflect the
political views of the would-be receivers, that is, the citizens
who invited the foreigners in the first place and those who,
but for the exclusion, would have communicated with the
foreigners. Outright exclusions, therefore, create an insur-
mountable content-based restriction on the right to receive in-
formation. Even when waivers are given, the effect is still a
significant content-based restriction, because the waiver pro-
cess is embarrassing 64 and burdensome, 65 sometimes to the
point of making the visit pointless. This burden on the receipt
of information is borne disproportionately by citizens with
particular political motives, such as the desire to receive a
communist or anarchical perspective on a given topic. The Act
does not, for example, require similar burdens on citizens
wishing to communicate with visiting capitalists, Tories, Con-
servatives, Socialists, Labourites, etc. Whenever citizens invite
politically incorrect, therefore excludable, foreigners to the
United States for speech-related activity, every United States
citizen who would otherwise have received information from
that alien has his or her rights curtailed based on the content
of the expected speech.
A similar governmental hindrance on the right to receive
communist political views was unanimously struck down by
the Supreme Court in Lamont v. Postmaster General. 66 In
Lamont, a Postal Service statute required the Postmaster Gen-
eral to detain unsealed foreign mailings of "Communist polit-
161. See supra text accompanying note 40.
162. Id.
163. See supra note 58.
164. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
166. 381 U.S. 301 (1964).
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ical propaganda" 16 7 and deliver only upon the addressee's
request. The statute was held unconstitutional as construed
and applied because it limited "the unfettered exercise of the
addressee's First Amendment rights."'16
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Lamont noted that
the lack of constitutional rights on the part of the sender was
irrelevant because "the Government is powerless to interfere
with the delivery of the material because the First Amend-
ment 'necessarily protects the right to receive it.' ",169 Even if
the Court accepted the government's characterization of the
statute as not intended to control the content of speech, and
only as incidentally affecting the exercise of first amendment
rights, the government would still be required to prove a
"compelling interest in the regulation of a subject within [the
government's] constitutional power to regulate" to justify the
limitation on first amendment freedoms. 7 0  Moreover, the
Court rejected the government's contention that the law's ef-
fect was not an abridgement of first amendment rights, but
merely an "inconvenience.' 71 "[W]e cannot sustain an intru-
sion on First Amendment rights on the ground that the intru-
sion is only a minor one.' 72
In Lamont the Court specifically applied the right to receive
information to the receipt of communist materials from for-
eign countries.1 73 The State Department's policy of burdening
the receipt of information from Communists in face-to-face
encounters is comparable. In both cases, the government has
placed a content-based restriction on the receipt of protected
communication. The Postal Service sought to bar ideas that
might "prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce, or in any
other way influence" the recipient. 74 Subsection 28 of the Mc-
Carran-Walter Act is similarly directed against "not active
167. l1& The statute, however, did not apply to material addressed to any United
States Government agency or any public library, or to any college, university, gradu-
ate school, or scientific or professional institution for advanced studies, or any offi-
cial thereof. Id. at 303.
168. Id, at 305.
169. Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Martin v. City of Struthers, 319
U.S. 141, 143 (1943)).
170. Id. at 308-09 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 438 (1963)).
171. Id. at 309 (Brennan, J., concurring).
172. Id.
173. Id at 307.
174. Id. at 302 n.1.
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subversion but belief and preachment.' 1 75 Lamont suggests
that unless the government can demonstrate a greater interest
in restricting receipt of an alien's ideas in person than it has in
restricting the receipt of his printed message, the burdens
placed on citizens wishing to receive information from visiting
Communists should similarly be found unconstitutionally con-
tent-based.
That subsections 27 and 28 of the McCarran-Walter Act im-
pose content-based restrictions on the right to receive informa-
tion is strongly suggested by the Supreme Court's long-
standing principle: "the State may not suppress exposure to
ideas-for the sole purpose of suppressing exposure to those
ideas-absent sufficiently compelling reasons."'17 6 As discussed
below, 77 the government has yet to show why its interest in
keeping communist ideas out of the country (when brought by
foreigners) is any greater than the interest the Court flatly
rejected in Lamont.
D. The Method of Restriction
Before considering whether the government has a compel-
ling interest in restricting the right to receive information
through its visa permit process, it is important to note the
method by which this restriction is carried out.
Subsections 27 and 28 of the McCarran-Walter Act are used
to prevent adherents of disfavored political ideologies and vo-
cal critics of administration policies from reaching the United
States, not to punish the expression or receipt of their speech
after its dissemination. 178 Because the Act restricts the receipt
of protected speech before its delivery, this method of re-
straint resembles a form of speech restriction that has long
been singled out for special judicial scrutiny, the prior
restraint.
Prior restraint is a term of art in constitutional law reserved
175. Mandel v. Mitchell, 325 F. Supp. 620, 625 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd sub nom
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
176. Board of Educ., Island Trees, Etc. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 877 (1982) (Blackmun,
J., concurring); see also Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1971);
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359
(1931).
177. See iifra text accompanying notes 259-330.
178. Under subsection 29, the government has the power to prevent the entry of
an alien who seeks to enter the U.S. to engage in unlawful activity relating to "pub-
lic disorder." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(29)(A) (1982).
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for "closely related, distinctive methods of regulating expres-
sion that are said to have in common their own peculiar set of
evils and problems .... ""' When applied to constitutionally
protected speech, prior restraints are "presumptively invalid
and may be sustained only under the most extraordinary
circumstances." 18
0
Of Professor Emerson's four broad categories of prior re-
straints, the "clearest form" arises when "government limita-
tion . . . undertakes to prevent future . . . communication
without advance approval of an executive official. ' 181 This is
the clearest form because, historically, prior restraint primar-
ily referred to administrative licensing schemes.182 The effect
of such schemes was that for several hundred years, up until
the late 1690's, Englishmen could not print or publish without
first obtaining a license from a government official. 83 Black-
stone' 1 and Milton 185 wrote persuasively about the evils of
such systems, and it was with the prevention of these systems
in mind that the framers of the Constitution drafted the first
amendment.186 Professor Emerson has listed the detriments
of such a system as follows: (1) Breadth: "[ilt subjects to gov-
ernment scrutiny and approval all expression in the area con-
trolled . . ."; (2) timing and delay: the system prevents the
communication from ever reaching the market, or delays it so
179. W.B. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, J.H. CHOPER & S.H. SHIFFRIN, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw 804 (1986).
180. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 234 (1984) (White, J., concurring).
181. Emerson, supra note 113, at 655-56. Of the remaining forms, the second form
is "based upon the injunction or similar process"; the third type involves legislative
restraints which "make unlawful publication or other communication unless there
has been previous compliance with specific conditions imposed by legislative act";
the fourth type of restraint "appears more indirect or secondary to some other im-
mediate objective."
182. Mayton, Toward a Theory of First Amendment Process: Inrjunctions of
Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 245, 247-49 (1982).
183. Emerson, supra note 113, at 650-51.
184. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 152; see also Jeffries, Rethinking
Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 412-13 (1983).
185. "If he [the censor] be of such worth as behooves him, there cannot be a more
tedious and unpleasing Journey-work, a greater losse of time levied upon his head,
then to be made the perpetuall reader of unchosen books and pamphlets... we may
easily forsee what kind of licencers we are to expect hereafter, either ignorant, im-
perious, and remisse, or basely pecuniary." J. MILTON, Areopagitica, in COMPLETE
POETRY AND SELECTED PROSE OF JOHN MILTON 677, 700 (Modern Library College
Ed. 1950).
186. Emerson, supra note 113, at 652.
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it becomes "obsolete or unprofitable"; (3) propensity toward
an adverse decision: the restriction is imposed "by a simple
stroke of a pen," and the burden is on the citizen to prove the
action mistaken; (4) procedure: because an administrative
rather than criminal procedure is used, none of the usual pro-
cedural protections-presumption of innocence, the govern-
ment's heavier burden of proof, the stricter rules of evidence,
the stronger objection to vagueness-are on the side of free
expression; (5) single functionary decision: one official may
make decisions affecting the first amendment freedoms of
large numbers of citizens, despite the value placed upon courts
and juries by the framers of the Constitution; (6) no opportu-
nity for public appraisal and criticism: policies and actions of
licensers are free from, or only subjected to minimal, public
scrutiny; (7) dynamics of prior restraint: such systems "contain
within themselves forces which drive irresistibly toward unin-
telligent, overzealous, and usually absurd administration"; (8)
certainty and risk: it promotes certainty only by rewarding
those willing to conform to official opinion; risk-takers are
preemptively silenced; and (9) effectiveness: "[a] system of
prior restraint is, in general, more readily and effectively en-
forced than a system of subsequent punishment.118 7
Visa delays and denials for ideological reasons engender
each one of these evils: (1) breadth: the Act is geared for uni-
versal restrictions upon all visiting Communists and any alien
whose presence is deemed "prejudicial to the public interest."
It makes no attempt to distinguish between potentially harm-
ful speech and the merely critical, or even the completely in-
nocuous; (2) timing and delay: as mentioned above, one of the
most disturbing aspects of the Act is its ability to prevent dis-
tinguished foreigners from attending conferences and other
events in the United States. This is done by outright denial or
by delaying the visa so long that the trip becomes pointless; (3)
propensity toward an adverse decision: the inability of foreign-
ers overseas to challenge visa denials makes restriction by the
consular official extremely easy and, therefore, more likely;
(4) procedure: citizens challenging the government's acts are
faced with the courts' traditional deference to executive immi-
gration policy, which significantly reduces procedural protec-
tions, even though citizens' rights are at stake; (5) single
187. Id. at 656-60.
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government functionary: a single consular official makes most
of the decisions to delay or deny visas; (6) no opportunity for
public appraisal: because of the secrecy allegedly vital for such
decisions, the sources of information leading to a visa denial
may be kept secret; (7) dynamics of prior restraint systems:
there is nothing to suggest that consular officials' decisions are
any less "unintelligent, overzealous, and usually absurd" than
are those of other licensors; (8) certainty and risk: past use of
the Act shows that risk-takers, i.e., those who vocally criticize
the administration, are more likely to be punished by delays
or denials in the visa process; and (9) effectiveness: of all the
forms of executive prior restraints, the restriction on the right
to receive information by the exclusion of aliens is uniquely
effective because of the virtual impossibility of defying the sys-
tem in order to test the law. Whereas a determined publisher
or movie theater operator may disobey a licensing system and
later challenge the system in court, foreigners denied entry
cannot circumvent the visa requirement in order to challenge
the exclusion's merit.
Ideological tests for visa applicants clearly allow placement
of restrictions on the information and ideas received by citi-
zens in ways paralleling traditional administrative licensing
systems. Although not necessarily unconstitutional, such prior
restraints are always highly suspect. The Supreme Court's
landmark case in this area is Freedman v. Maryland.' In
Freedman, the defendant was convicted of exhibiting a motion
picture without submitting it to the Maryland State Board of
Censors for prior approval.8 9 Freedman held that "any sys-
tem of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bear-
ing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity." 190
Furthermore, the Maryland system was struck down because
it had inadequate safeguards to prevent the undue inhibition
of protected expression. 9' Freedman held that any system of
prior restraints must have four procedural safeguards to avoid
constitutional infirmity: (1) the government must initiate ad-
versarial court proceedings; (2) the burden of proving the ma-
terial is unprotected "must rest on the censor"; (3) the system
must insure "prompt judicial review" to prevent the adminis-
188. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
189. Id
190. Id, at 57 (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
191. Id. at 59-60.
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trative decision of the censor from achieving an effect of final-
ity; and (4) any restraint in advance must be "for the shortest
fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution." '192
Although created for a municipal film censorship system,
the Freedman standards subsequently have been applied in
many contexts,19 including the seizure by customs agents of
allegedly obscene materials.194 As noted earlier, the Court re-
peatedly has held the right to receive information and ideas
exists independently of the right to speak.1 95 Therefore, it is
appropriate to utilize the prior restraint model when analyz-
ing government action that restricts only the right to receive.
The Act fails each of the Freedman tests because (1) it
places the burden of initiating court proceedings on the citi-
zens whose rights are infringed; (2) the government need not
make any showing that the expected speech will be unpro-
tected in order to justify the burden of a waiver; (3) the sys-
tem does not insure prompt judicial review nor prevent the
consular official's decision from having a final effect in many
cases; and (4) it does not restrain speech for "the shortest
fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution."'196
When courts uphold prior restraint systems, it is done to
protect the government's right to determine, before dissemina-
tion, that speech is not obscene or otherwise unprotected by
the Constitution. In the McCarran-Walter Act permit system,
however, expected speech is assumed to be worthy of restric-
tion simply because it is to be received from Communists.
Similar discretionary powers to restrict first amendment free-
doms based solely on the identity of the speaker have been
repeatedly struck down by the Court. In Schneider v. State,197
the challenged ordinance gave a chief of police power to deny
canvassing permits if the applicant was "not of good charac-
ter."19 The Court found the law invalid, accepting the doc-
192. Id. at 58-60.
193. Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1970) (postal stop orders of obscene materials);
Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (denial of permit to use
municipal theater for the musical "Hair"); Carroll v. President and Commissioners
of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968) (ten day restraining order against particular
rallies or meetings).
194. United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
195. See supra text accompanying notes 119-39.
196. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-60.
197. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
198. Id. at 158.
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trine of prior restraint to prohibit any system of advance
permission based on the alleged character of the speaker.' 99
Similarly, in Niemotko v. Maryland,2° the Court overturned
the disorderly conduct convictions of two Jehovah's Witnesses,
who were arrested when they used a city park for Bible talks
after being denied a permit. The Court found that first
amendment rights are abridged when permits can be denied
"because of the City Council's dislike for or disagreement with
the Witnesses or their views."20' In discussing the various fac-
tors used to decide such cases, Justice Frankfurter noted in his
concurring opinion that "[a] licensing standard which gives an
official authority to censor the content of a speech differs toto
coelo from one limited by its terms, or by nondiscriminatory
practice, to considerations of public safety and the like. '20 2
The State Department's system of burdening the entry of
aliens on the basis of their political beliefs ineluctably pro-
duces an administrative licensing system for the information
and ideas available to the American public. Of course, just as
a city may require park users to have permits, the government
has legitimate interests in issuing permits to visit the United
States. The Court, however, has "consistently condemned li-
censing systems which vest in an administrative official discre-
tion to grant or withhold a permit upon broad criteria
unrelated to proper regulation of public places. "203 Licenses,
in the form of easily-obtained visas, are made available to
aliens with orthodox political views. However, citizens at-
tempting to receive similar information from vocal critics of
administration policy or from aliens affiliated with suspect or-
ganizations will find the permit for their source of informa-
tion, the alien, delayed or denied. The system demands
differential treatment based not on any measurable difference
in the nature or context of the expected speech, but simply
upon the identity of the source. This directly reflects upon the
political beliefs of the would-be receivers. Absent a showing
that the permit system is necessary to avoid utterances "so de-
famatory, insulting, inciting, or provocative as to be reasonably
199. 1& at 161.
200. 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
201. Id at 272.
202. Id. at 282 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
203. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 294 (1951).
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likely to cause disorder and violence, ' ' 204 the State Depart-
ment's permit systems should not have discretionary authority
to delay or deny visas because of the expected content of the
speech.
E. Effects
Apart from the issues of the method of restriction and
whether a law is aimed at the content of speech, "[iun every
case . . .where legislative abridgement of [first amendment]
rights is asserted, the courts should be astute to examine the
effect of the challenged legislation. ' 20 5 The effects of the Mc-
Carran-Walter Act are both concrete2 0 and intangible. °7 Sev-
eral effects of the Act are especially burdensome to first
amendment freedoms and deserve separate attention.
1. Burdening a Particular Mode
One of the most troubling aspects of the Act is that it bur-
dens a particular mode of information receipt, namely face-to-
face contact with foreigners. The Supreme Court in Klein-
dienst v. Mandel noted the "particular qualities inherent in
sustained, face-to-face debate, discussion and questioning. '2°8
Justice Marshall's dissent was more forceful: "[t]he availability
to appellees of Mandel's books and taped lectures is no substi-
tute for live, face-to-face discussion and debate, just as the
availability to us of briefs and exhibits does not supplant the
essential place of oral argument in this Court's work. ' '2°9 The
majority, however, did not address the weight of this burden,
because it considered a weighing of first amendment values to
be unnecessary.210
204. Id, at 305 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
205. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
206. In terms of initial visa denials under subsections 27 and 28, over 178,000 visas
were originally refused in the last ten year period. See supra note 58. The visas are
refused because the applicant's name shows up in the "lookout list," maintained by
the State Department and the INS. It is estimated that over 50,000 foreigners are
currently targeted for exclusion based on ideological grounds. See N.Y. Times, Aug.
23, 1986, at 26, col. 6. After the preliminary refusal, the applicant may make an
additional application for a waiver that may take weeks or months to process. Ad-
mittedly, most waivers are approved, but over this same period there were over 9,000
final exclusions, most of these under subsection 28. See supra note 58.
207. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
208. 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972).
209. I& at 776-77 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 777.
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A recent case, Minneapolis Star v. Minnesota Commissioner
of Revenue,211 also dealt with a burden on a particular mode of
communication. In Minneapolis Star, the state legislature
passed a special use tax on ink and paper that effectively
taxed only large newspapers. 2  The Court, while recognizing
the "crucial" state interest in the power to tax, held that "[a]
tax that burdens rights protected by the First Amendment
cannot stand unless the burden is necessary to achieve an
overriding governmental interest."" 3 The Court, fearing the
potential for abuse, noted that "differential treatment, unless
justified by some special characteristic . . .suggests that the
goal of the regulation is not unrelated to suppression of ex-
pression, and such a goal is presumptively unconstitutional. 2 1 4
The lack of legislative intent to restrict first amendment free-
doms was considered irrelevant. "Illicit legislative intent is
not the sine qua non of a violation of the First Amend-
ment. 2 1 5 The Court found the state's power to "singl[e] out a
few members of the press presents such a potential for abuse
that no interest suggested by Minnesota can justify the
scheme. '2 1 6
Similarly, the legislative intent of the McCarran-Walter Act
was unrelated to suppression of the right to receive informa-
tion. However, courts should be willing to recognize the po-
tential for abuse that exists when, out of the many avenues of
incoming foreign information and ideas, only in-person visits
by foreigners are methodically delayed and often denied.
2. Inadequate Alternative Modes
A restriction on first amendment rights may also be invalid
if "remaining modes of communication are inadequate. '217
This requirement is generally used in connection with what
are termed "reasonable time, place or manner restrictions. 2 1 8
Outside of time, place or manner analysis, 9 the Court has
211. 460 U.S. 575 (1982).
212. IM at 578.
213. 1d at 582.
214. Id at 585.
215. Id at 592.
216. Id
217. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 (1984).
218. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'r, 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1979).
219. A time, place, or manner restriction on protected speech is valid only "if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental in-
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recently stated that inadequate remaining modes of expression
may, by themselves, invalidate a restriction on expressive ac-
tivity.220  In City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,2 21 the
Court upheld a Los Angeles ordinance which banned the post-
ing of signs on public property.222 In discussing modes of com-
munication left open in spite of the ordinance, the majority
noted that "there is no reason to believe that these same ad-
vantages cannot be obtained through other means."223 Also,
the banned mode was not "uniquely valuable or important,"
nor was the "ability to communicate effectively" threatened.2 4
In applying these tests to the diminished ability of citizens
to communicate with foreigners under the McCarran-Walter
Act, it is helpful to recall the Mandel Court's recognition of
the "particular qualities inherent in sustained, face-to-face de-
bate, discussion and questioning. ' 225 The Mandel Court re-
jected government arguments that face-to-face communication
provided no unique advantages. 2 6 Reasonable alternatives are
available to users of sound trucks,227 billboards,22 and those
wishing to demonstrate on government property.229 However,
the proposition that face-to-face communication, especially for
activities such as conferences, university lectures, and partici-
pation in peace rallies, has no reasonable alternatives seems
self-evident. Making this point in Mandel, Justice Marshall
said, "[1]engthy citations for this proposition, which the major-
terest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restric-
tion on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). This
concept is inapplicable to ideological exclusions for several reasons: this type of re-
striction is only appropriate for speech taking place in a public forum, "may not be
based upon either the content or subject matter of speech" and cannot allow for
prohibition "merely because public officials disapprove the speaker's views." Consol-
idated Edison, 447 U.S. at 536 (quoting Neimotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282
(1951)).
220. "[A] restriction on expressive activity may be invalid if the remaining modes
of communication are inadequate." Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812.
221. Id at 789.
222. Id. at 791.
223. Id at 812.
224. Id.
225. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972).
226. Id
227. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
228. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
229. Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 648
(1980).
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ity apparently concedes, are unnecessary.""
Furthermore, the inadequacy of alternate modes in visa de-
nial cases may result in a complete ban on face-to-face meet-
ings when the visiting foreigner is from a country (such as
Cuba) to which travel by U.S. citizens is forbidden or severely
restricted.23'
3. Disfavoring Selected Views
Another effect of ideological exclusions is the dampening
of political discussion in the United States. Barring or delay-
ing holders of unpopular political communication abrogates
the policy underlying the first amendment that gives "the
broadest protection to such political expression in order to as-
sure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people. '23 2
This suppression of disfavored views on foreign policy is es-
pecially harmful because
[i]n the absence of the governmental checks and balances
present in other areas of our national life, the only effective
restraint upon executive policy and power in the areas of na-
tional defense and international affairs may lie in an enlight-
ened citizenry-in an informed and critical public opinion
which alone can here protect the values of democratic
government.2 3
Arguably, the primary effect of ideological exclusions under
the McCarran-Walter Act is that it leaves American citizens
uninformed and uncritical of U.S. foreign relations.
F. Unconstitutional Language
Two related doctrines apply with special force to the lan-
guage of statutes that abut first amendment rights: the vague-
ness doctrine and the substantial overbreadth doctrine.
1. Vagueness
When litigants can attack a statute without reference to
230. 408 U.S. at 776-77 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See supra note 209 and ac-
companying text.
231. Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880, 886 n.20 (D.D.C. 1984).
232. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 626-27 n.3 (1976) (citing Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
233. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
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their own conduct, the law is said to be challenged "on its
face." The Supreme Court will "permit a facial challenge if
a law reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally pro-
tected conduct. 234 Courts allow facial attacks upon laws re-
stricting first amendment rights based solely on vagueness.
One rationale for permitting such an attack is that such laws
may have an in terrorem effect: they may have a chilling ef-
fect on even protected speech because "any attempt to enforce
such legislation would create an unacceptable risk of the sup-
pression of ideas. '235 A second reason for requiring well-de-
fined restrictions is to provide those charged with enforcement
an objective standard by which to measure conduct and to
avoid the vices associated with arbitrary discretionary
power.236 Third, laws must be narrowly drawn to insure that
protected activities are not punished along with those justifia-
bly prohibited.237
The rationales supporting attack on vague regulations leave
subsection 27 of the McCarran-Walter Act highly suspect.
This subsection calls for exclusion of those who the govern-
ment "has reason to believe" seek to enter the country to "en-
gage in activities which would be prejudicial to the public
interest. '238
The Act's vagueness makes it difficult for citizens inviting
foreigners to the United States to know who will be excluded
or delayed. In some instances, U.S. audiences are reluctant to
extend invitations to foreign speakers, fearing embarrassment
may result if the speaker is labeled prejudicial to the public
interest.239 This chilling effect on the proponents of speech
has long been recognized by the Supreme Court as an in-
dependent harm that does not require actual application of the
statute.240 Given the Court's declarations concerning the inde-
pendence and strength of the right to receive information, a
"reverse chilling effect," i.e., one that affects only the would-
be recipients of speech, is consistent with long-standing first
amendment theory.
234. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 359 n.8 (1983) (citing Hoffman Estates v.
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982)).
235. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 797 (1984).
236. See supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
237. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
238. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27) (1982).
239. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1052 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
240. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940).
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The second major rationale for voiding vague statutes is the
discretionary power they give government officials to deter-
mine the extent of the first amendment.2 41
As examples of aliens who should be denied entry under
subsection 27, Congress gives the following examples: (1)
Aliens who "might engage in political or conspiratorial activi-
ties against the United States or foreign governments"; (2)
aliens "known or believed to be members of terrorist organiza-
tions engaging in activities such as political kidnapping, hi-
jacking and extortion"; (3) aliens "who are known or believed
to be operatives of underworld criminal organizations"; and
(4) aliens "notorious for allegedly engaging in excesses, includ-
ing physical brutality while in political power in their native
land, or who were prominently identified with any former re-
gime which did So. ''242 The paucity of other directions for the
use of subsection 27, combined with the conflicting testimony
of past and present State Department officials, led the D.C.
Court of Appeals in Abourezk v. Reagan to conclude the evi-
dence was "inadequate to enable a court to determine reliably
the nature of the general administrative practice under sub-
section 27. ' '24a Yet, despite this inability, the court does not
mention vagueness. The district court's response to the vague-
ness argument in Abourezk was somewhat more direct, if no
more helpful. That court said it was "[1]eaving to one side the
question whether these terms are so vague and broad that
they lend themselves to the suppression of speech that the
government finds inconvenient .... 44 The only other re-
sponse to the vagueness claim appears in a footnote: "in for-
eign affairs matters and those involving the admission of
aliens, the political branches have the widest possible latitude
in these respects. '245 This is, apparently, an oblique reference
to the political question doctrine, which states that courts
should refuse to decide questions of a "purely political nature"
241. In visa denial cases, the preliminary determination of who fits the exclusion
subsections is left not to a court or even a high-ranking government official, but to
consular officers stationed around the world. If the person is believed excludable,
the request is forwarded to the State Department, which makes the final determina-
tion. See 22 C.F.R. § 41.130(c) (1985).
242. Foreign Affairs Manual, Pt. II, § 41.91(a)(27), reprinted in 6 C. GORDEN & H.
ROSENFELD, IMMIGRATION LAW & PROCEDURE 32-214.18 (1985).
243. 785 F.2d at 1055.
244. Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880, 885 (D.D.C. 1984).
245. Id at 886 n.19.
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because to do so "would involve an encroachment upon: the
executive or legislative powers. "246 However, the district court
ignores that Kleindienst v. Mandel and its progeny strongly
indicate that cases interpreting the ideological exclusion, sub-
sections are judicially reviewable. In Mandel, the Supreme
Court could have declared the interpretation of subsection 28
to be a political question and left it at that. Instead, Mandel
set precedent for several cases in which federal courts have
exercised a role, albeit limited, in enforcing constitutional re-
straints on the executive's implementation of ideological ex-
clusions when citizens' first amendment rights are involved.247
This means that the problem of discretionary power produced
by the vagueness of subsection 27 cannot be avoided by noting
the involvement of the political branches. The Supreme Court
has carefully distinguished "political questions" from "political
cases," holding that courts cannot reject "a bona fide contro-
versy as to whether some action denominated 'political', ex-
ceeds constitutional authority. '248
The third evil of vague first amendment laws is that thqin-
nocent may be punished along with the guilty. The concept of
"guilty" parties is meaningless in ideological exclusion cases
given the government's power to exclude foreigners based on
the content of their expected speech and on their beliefs, with-
out regard to the first amendment protection such speech and
beliefs would receive once the aliens are in the United States.
Citizens desirous of meeting with excludable foreigners are
the most immediately affected, but perhaps the party most
"innocent" is the general public. As Justice Marshall noted in
his dissent in Mandel, "a general public interest in the preven-
tion of any stifling of political utterance" must be consid-
ered.249  The public interest suffers under such a system
because "every person must be his own watchman for truth,
because the forefathers did not trust any government to sepa-
rate the true from the false for us. '250
246. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-10 (1962).
247. Harvard Law School Forum v. Shultz, 633 F. Supp. 525, 529 (D. Mass. 1986).
248. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
249. 408 U.S. 753, 776 (1972) (Marshall, J. dissenting) (quoting Mandel v. Mitchell,
325 F. Supp. 620, 632 (1971)).
250. Id at 773 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
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2. Substantial Overbreadth
A statute may also be facially challenged on substantial
overbreadth grounds when there is "a realistic danger that the
statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First
Amendment protections of parties not before the Court ....
[Such a statute] may be challenged on its face even though a
more narrowly drawn statute would be valid as applied to the
party in the case before it."'251 Recently, the Supreme Court
pronounced the overbreadth doctrine "strong medicine" that
should be used "only as a last resort. 252
A recent case, however, suggests that the Court will employ
a generous use of the doctrine in some circumstances. Secre-
tary of State of Maryland v. J.H. Munson 253 dealt with con-
tracts between charities and professional fundraising
organizations where the latter worked on a percentage basis.
The Court struck down a law that imposed a twenty-five per-
cent cap on the percentage the charities could pay the fun-
draisers for their services. Calling this a "direct restriction on
protected First Amendment activity," the Court held that
when the "means chosen to accomplish the State's objectives
are too imprecise, so that in all its applications the statute cre-
ates an unnecessary risk of chilling free speech, the statute is
properly subject to facial attack. ' '2M While not doubting that
some organizations have high fundraising costs for reasons not
protected by the first amendment, the Court found that the
statute could not distinguish those organizations from the
charities whose high fundraising costs are due only to pro-
tected first amendment activity. 5 The Court held the flaw in
the statute to be that "in all its applications it operate[d] on a
f-dndamentally mistaken premise" that high solicitation costs
are an accurate measure of fraud.2
The operative, though unstated, premise of the McCarran-
Walter Act is that certain ideas are more dangerous when
presented in person than they are through media. The law re-
stricts the receipt of information from alien Communists in
person, but not through their books, via telephone, or through
251. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801 (1984).
252. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).
253. 467 U.S. 947 (1983).
254. Id at 968-69.
255. Id at 966.
256. Id
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the mails. Is not this operative premise similarly fundamen-
tally mistaken such that "in all its applications the statute cre-
ates an unnecessary risk of chilling free speech"?. 7
Dissenting in Kleindienst v. Mandel, Justice Marshall appar-
ently believed so. He wrote: "Without any claim that Mandel
'live' is an actual threat to this country, there is no difference
between excluding Mandel because of his ideas and keeping
his books out because of their ideas. Neither is permitted. '25 8
G. Governmental Interests
Once it is determined that a statute is aimed at the content
of speech or seeks to favor some viewpoints at the expense of
others, a law restricting protected speech must be struck down
unless a compelling state interest is shown and the restriction
is no greater than necessary to achieve the state's goal. 2 5 9 Fur-
thermore, "the burden is on the government to show the
existence of such an interest. '26 0
Despite the Court's claim in Mandel that it was not weigh-
ing the governmental interests against the right to receive in-
formation, it nevertheless named several governmental
interests, including Congress' plenary power over immigra-
tion,2 1 the executive branch's control over international rela-
tions,262 the judiciary's interest in not having to "weigh the
strength of the audience's interest against that of the Govern-
ment in refusing a waiver to the particular alien applicant ac-
cording to some as yet undetermined standard, '263 and the
dangers and undesirability of such a balancing based on "the
size of the audience or the probity of the speaker's ideas. 26 4
The Court's reluctance to create a standard for weighing citi-
zens' rights against governmental interests is curious consider-
ing it created the legitimate and bona fide standard for the
very same issue. Additionally, it is unclear why the Court
feels it would be necessary to weigh the size of the audience or
257. Id at 966, 968.
258. 408 U.S. 753, 784 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
259. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 821 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
260. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978) (quoting Elrod
v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976)).
261. 408 U.S. at 766.
262. Id at 765.
263. Id. at 769.
264. Id
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the probity of the speaker's ideas. Regarding probity, the
Supreme Court has already established that the "right to re-
ceive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, is
fundamental to our free society. 2 65 As to the claim that audi-
ence size will be a troublesome factor to weigh, the Court has
previously weighed the rights of audiences of varying sizes in
several right to receive cases. Thomas v. Collins2" dealt with
the rights of large numbers of workers to hear a labor orga-
nizer soliciting union membership. The Court found the
workers' rights abridged by a state law requiring registration
of such organizers. 267 A much larger, and arguably more im-
measurable, interest was weighed in Red Lion Broadcasting v.
FCC.286 There, the Court weighed the interest of millions of
television and radio receivers "to receive suitable access to so-
cial, political, aesthetic, moral, and other ideas and exper-
iences. '26 9 At the other end of the spectrum, the Court has, in
right to receive cases, weighed the rights of single individu-
als.27 0 Lamont v. Postmaster General,27 ' described supra,2 72 is
one such example. There, the Court unanimously found the
government's interest in controlling the flow of foreign Com-
munist propaganda to be outweighed by a single individual's
right to receive such material. Thus, it would seem that how-
ever many citizens are affected by the government's decision
to deny a visa on political or ideological grounds, a balancing
standard that weighs citizens' right to receive information
against the government's interest in blocking such information
would not be unprecedented.
1. The Power to Exclude
The Constitution does not specifically grant the federal gov-
ernment power to exclude aliens.2  Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has found the power inherent in sover-
265. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
266. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
267. Id. at 534.
268. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
269. Id, at 390.
270. See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
271. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
272. See supra text accompanying notes 166-77.
273. The Constitution gives Congress the power "[t]o establish an Uniform Rule
of Naturalization . . . " U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
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eignty.2 7 4 The Mandel Court cited The Chinese Exclusion
Case275 and Fong Yue Ting v. United States276 to support this
proposition. However, Fong Yue Ting dealt with expulsion
rather than exclusion,277 and in The Chinese Exclusion Case,
the power to exclude was limited to aliens who were "danger-
ous to peace and security, "278 or "deemed injurious or a source
of danger to the country. 2 79 Justice Field's dissent in Fong
Yue Ting denied the existence of such inherent powers. He
described our government as one of "limited and delegated
powers" that takes no power from any "supposed inherent
* sovereignty." 28 '
2. Control Over Immigration
While Congress has a significant interest in controlling im-
migration, a "plenary" power over the admission of aliens is
not explicit in the Constitution.28 1 But the power over natu-
ralization 28 2 and the necessary and proper clause2 3 have long
been interpreted to give Congress power to exclude aliens for
any reason.28 4 Nevertheless, the Court has often referred to a
limited judicial review of immigration law with respect to
Congress' power to regulate admission or exclusion of
aliens.28 5
What distinguishes cases such as Mandel and Abourezk from
other Supreme Court immigration cases is the implication of
citizens' first amendment rights. Although Congress has
broad power to deal with aliens, "all governmental power-
even the war power, the power to maintain national security,
274. This phrase was first used in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651,
659 (1892), and was used in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 765 (1972) (quoting
Brief for Appellants at 20). The concept of sovereign powers has been strongly criti-
cized. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 757 (1893) (Field, J.,
dissenting).
275. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
276. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
277. Id. at 699.
278. 130 U.S. at 606.
279. Id. at 608.
280. 149 U.S. at 757 (Field, J., dissenting).
281. See U.S. CONST. art. 1.
282. Id. at § VIII, cl. 4.
283. Id. at § VIII, cl. 18.
284. Voight, Visa Denials On Ideological Grounds and the First Amendment
Right to Receive Information: The Case for Stricter Judicial Scrutiny, 17 CUMB. L.
REV. 139, 151 (1984).
285. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 793 n.5 (1977).
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or the power to conduct foreign affairs-is limited by the Bill
of Rights."28 In numerous immigration cases, the Court has
refused to grant Congress absolute power when the rights of
citizens, and even those of resident aliens, are involved. One
recent example is Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong. 87 In Mow
Sun Wong, the Court struck down a Civil Service Commission
regulation which barred noncitizens from civil service jobs.
Despite recognizing the "political character" of the govern-
ment's power over immigration and naturalization, the Court
found "countervailing considerations" and denied the govern-
ment the authority to apply different substantive rules to resi-
dent aliens than those applied to citizens.8 8 Similarly, United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce8 9 balanced the power of the INS
with the fourth amendment right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.' Brignoni-Ponce held that the fourth
amendment does not allow roving border patrol agents to stop
vehicles near the Mexican-American border and detain occu-
pants if the only justification for doing so is the Hispanic ap-
pearance of the occupants. The Court held even "the broad
congressional power over immigration cannot.., diminish the
Fourth Amendment rights of citizens who may be mistaken
for aliens. '
291
Constitutional rights are, therefore, a proper judicial con-
cern in the area of immigration. This is not a recent develop-
ment, but rather represents the longstanding principle that all
executive and judicial powers are "restricted in their exercise
only by the Constitution itself and considerations of public
policy and justice. 292
3. Foreign Relations
The government claims a compelling interest in the ability
to exclude foreigners because exclusion is a tool the State De-
partment can use to "communicate an attitude" to other gov-
286. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 782-83 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
287. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
288. Id, at 101-02.
289. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
290. Id, at 877. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
... but upon probable cause." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
291. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884.
292. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889).
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ernments.2a9 3  This is because "the issuance, denial or
revocation of a NIV [non-immigrant visa] to a particular alien
can have significant diplomatic or foreign policy ramifications
to the extent that the issuance or denial is construed as an act
of the United States Government. ' ' 94 However, this argument
has merit only as long as ideological exclusions are permitted.
Foreign governments can infer signals only to the extent that
our government is permitted to make exclusions for foreign
policy reasons. As these exclusions are no longer being made,
no inferences can be drawn from the issuance of visas, and the
ramifications vanish.
Furthermore, the Court has previously recognized constitu-
tional limitations on the exercise of foreign relations in many
contexts. In Perez v. Brownell,295 the Court considered the
constitutionality of an expatriation statute challenging the
government's power to deprive an individual of citizenship
when the citizen's actions hindered the conduct of foreign af-
fairs .2  The Court held that "[t]he restrictions confining Con-
gress in the exercise of any of the powers expressly delegated
to it in the Constitution apply with equal vigor when that body
seeks to regulate our relations with other nations. '297
Similarly, in Aptheker v. Secretary of State,298 the Court
weighed the government's foreign relations power against citi-
zens' right to travel outside the country. The Court held that
the government's desire to deny passports to American Com-
munists for foreign policy reasons was outweighed by the ap-
plicants' rights. The Court found that "the Constitution
requires that the powers of government 'must be so exercised
as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe' a
constitutionally protected freedom."'
Additionally, the government often claims a foreign policy
interest in controlling aliens without distinguishing between
those who seek permanent residence in the United States and
those who are merely temporary visitors. Non-immigrants'
visits do not require the extensive political policy-making that
293. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J., dis-
senting).
294. Id.
295. 356 U.S. 44 (1957).
296. Id. at 57.
297. Id. at 58.
298. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
299. Id. at 509 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1941)).
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influences immigration decisions such as those dealing with
Haitian refugees, amnesty for illegal Central American immi-
grants, and the political ramifications of granting haven to cel-
ebrated exiles. Consequently, while these and many other
INS and State Department actions have significant foreign re-
lations aspects, the issuance of temporary non-immigrant visas
is, except for ideological exclusions, non-political. 
3 1
In Baker v. Carr,30 ' the Court stated that "[iut is error to
suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign
relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.1 30 2 Thus, the invoca-
tion of foreign affairs should not predetermine a ruling in the
government's favor when citizens' first amendment rights are
implicated.
4. National Security
The government claims that an absolute power to exclude
aliens for national security reasons is a compelling interest
303
that is vital to "[defend] the country against foreign encroach-
ments and dangers. 30 4 National security crises arise quickly,
it is argued, and requiring the government to bring court pro-
ceedings to implement alien national security exclusions
would hamstring our national defense.30 5 The core of this ar-
gument is the belief that the judiciary is ill-equipped to evalu-
ate national security decisions made by State Department
officials.3 6
Few deny the government's authority to keep dangerous
foreigners from entering the country. Criminals, 307 sabo-
teurs, 308 and spies309 are all justifiably excludable under the
McCarran-Walter Act. Further, if good grounds exist for be-
lieving an alien will "engage in activities which would be pro-
hibited by the laws of the United States relating to... public
300. Voight, supra note 284, at 153.
301. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
302. I& at 211.
303. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972).
304. Id,
305. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J., dis-
senting).
306. Id, at 1076.
307. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9), (10) (1982).
308. Id at (a)(29).
309. Id
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disorder," he also may be excluded.1 0 Therefore, restricting
the receipt of information based upon the identity of the
speaker is unnecessary to protect against inciteful or other-
wise dangerous speech.
These and other health, safety, and welfare exclusions seem
to make national security protection by way of subsections 27
and 28 superfluous unless the government contends, and can
demonstrate, that these subsections are needed to protect
against a unique evil.
The Kleindienst v. Mandel Court did not examine these sub-
sections on any such rational basis. Instead, the Court stated
that "without exception [the Court] has sustained Congress'
plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens and to
exclude those who possess those characteristics which Con-
gress has forbidden. 3 1 .1 However, two inconsistencies exist
with this deferential treatment. The fact that the Court held
the issue to be justiciable, and that it created a new standard
by which the law is to be tested, shows that Congress does not
have "plenary" power in this area: this is not a political ques-
tion.1 2 Second, of the thirteen immigration cases cited for
support by the majority in Mandel, not a single one implicated
citizens' first amendment rights. To apply the same deferen-
tial treatment to laws affecting citizens' rights as has been ap-
plied in the past to similar laws affecting only aliens ignores
that "[w]here constitutionally protected rights are at stake...
notions of automatic deference disappear. "313
In other contexts the Court has not hesitated to weigh the
assertion of executive power in national security matters
against citizens' rights.1 4 In first amendment cases, the Court
is especially alert to scrutinize alleged national security
310. Id. at (a)(29)(A).
311. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 766 (quoting Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967)).
312. See supra text accompanying note 247.
313. Faruki v. Rogers, 349 F. Supp. 723, 732 (D.D.C. 1972).
314. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), involved a govern-
ment attempt to block the publication of classified material on the grounds that "dis-
closure would endanger national security." Id. at 718; Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1(1965), involved the State Department's refusal to validate the passport of a citizen
wishing to visit Cuba, arguing that to do so would "aid the spread of subversion." Id.
at 14.
[Vol. 11:335
IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSIONS
interests 15  In New York Times v. United States,1 6 the
Supreme Court balanced the executive's war power against
the right to publish and the public's right to receive informa-
tion. 7 Justice Black, concurring, noted that "[t]he word 'se-
curity' is a broad, vague generality whose contour should not
be invoked to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the
First Amendment."3 8
Similarly, the government's use of the McCarran-Walter
Act invokes a broad security purpose to protect the nation
from the supposed security threat posed by individuals belong-
ing to suspect groups.3 19 However, over the last ten years,
ninety-five percent of aliens excludable because of affiliations
with proscribed organizations under subsection 28 were ulti-
mately granted waivers and allowed to enter.2 INS statistics
thus support the proposition that what was once considered a
national security threat, namely the mere presence of Com-
munists within our borders, is no longer perceived as such.
Furthermore, those denied waivers are more often the victims
of international politics than products of Congress' concern for
the nation's security. 21
Additionally, the nonreviewable power to exclude for na-
tional security reasons should be curtailed because of past ex-
clusions that have later turned out to be groundless. For
example, Canadian author Farley Mowat was excluded as a
national security threat because he jokingly told an inter-
viewer that he was ready to protest American B-52 bomber
training runs over Newfoundland with a .22 caliber rifle.
Massive publicity followed and the ban was retracted.322 Judi-
cial review is a necessary check to avoid such abuses of discre-
tionary executive power.
Given the traditional suspicion of unchecked bureaucratic
power, the Court's willingness to examine assertions of na-
tional security in other contexts, and the past abuses of the
315. "The guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed
representative government provides no real security for our Republic." New York
Times, 403 U.S. at 719 (Black, J., concurring).
316. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
317. Id. at 714.
318. Id. at 719 (Black, J., concurring).
319. See supra notes 41-44.
320. See supra note 58.
321. Schapiro, supra note 2, at 30.
322. Id
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Act in the name of national security, it is clear that some judi-
cial review of national security exclusions is needed.
The Mandel "legitimate and bona fide" test can only provide
a useful standard for judicial review if first amendment rights
are given the weight accorded in other right to receive cases.
Although not specifically addressing national security asser-
tions, two cases have weighed the government's foreign policy
interest, which is accorded similar deference. 23 Harvard Law
School Forum v. Shult 2 4 dealt with a travel request by a
member of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Harvard
held that the State Department's denial of the alien's request
was "not facially legitimate because it [was] related to the sup-
pression of protected political discussion.312 5 Similarly, in Al-
lende v. Shultz,3 26 a district court rejected as "entirely
conclusory" the State Department's unsubstantiated claim
that the presence of Mrs. Salvador Allende would be "prejudi-
cial to the conduct of foreign affairs. '3 27 An analogous level of
scrutiny for national security exclusions would hold them in-
valid if they are merely attempts to suppress disfavored polit-
ical views.
Congressional support for such a restriction on the govern-
ment is clear from the temporary Moynihan-Frank amend-
ment,32 a which legislatively establishes this standard of review.
While banning ideological exclusions, it leaves intact the vari-
ous health, safety, and welfare exclusions of the Act and spe-
cifically provides for the exclusion of aliens whose presence
would threaten national security.3 29 The national security ex-
emption is narrowed to disallow denials based on "past, cur-
rent, or expected beliefs, statements, or associations" in which
citizens could lawfully engage.33 0 This is strong evidence that
protection of national security interests and the prohibition of
ideological exclusions need not be considered mutually exclu-
sive. However, because the Moynihan-Frank amendment ex-
323. Harvard Law School Forum v. Shultz, 633 F. Supp. 525, 531 (D. Mass. 1986);
Allende v. Shultz, 605 F. Supp. 1220 (D. Mass. 1985).
324. 633 F. Supp. at 525.
325. Id at 531.
326. 605 F. Supp. at 1220.
327. Id. at 1225.
328. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, as
amended, Pub. L. No. 100-461, § 555, 102 Stats. 2268-36, -37 (1988).
329. Id. at -73.
330. Id
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pires January 1, 1991, soon courts will again face the issue: Are
ideological exclusions legitimate exercises of the executive's
national security power? If the Supreme Court does not clar-
ify the Mandel test, disparate results will most likely continue.
Courts may resolve this problem by incorporating the intent
of the Moynihan-Frank standard into their analysis. Even
if no longer binding, it will provide unequivocal evidence of
congressional intent and can supply a rational standard for
narrowing the Mandel "legitimate and bona fide" test, thus
circumscribing the use of national security exclusions for
political purposes.
Conclusion
The first amendment protects the right to receive informa-
tion."3' This right is separate and co-equal with the freedom of
speech guaranteed by the first amendment.3 2 It arises when
citizens seek to receive information or ideas from aliens wish-
ing to visit the United States.3 3 Subsections 27 and 28 of the
McCarran-Walter Act burden the receipt of this speech based
on the speaker's political views and the expected political na-
ture of the proposed speech. This directly affects citizens with
shared political views when they attempt to obtain informa-
tion and ideas from visiting foreigners. Political speech is enti-
tled to "the fullest possible measure of constitutional
protection. 3 3 4 The right to receive political speech from for-
eign countries is not lessened when that speech is Communist
propaganda.3 5 Therefore, exclusionary provisions using the
McCarren-Walter Act to delay or ban selected individuals fa-
vors the right to receive one set of political views over
another.
The executive branch's authority to guide foreign policy and
national security does not remove its acts from constitutional
restraints, nor does Congress' power over immigration shield
its actions from constitutional scrutiny.3 6 It is the duty of the
331. "In a variety of contexts, this Court has referred to a First Amendment right
to 'receive information and ideas.'" Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972).
332. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
333. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 765.
334. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 816 (1984).
335. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., con-
curring).
336. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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courts to weigh the first amendment interests in receiving in-
formation from aliens against the government's power to ex-
clude that information. Unless such a statute serves a
compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored so
as to restrict speech rights as little as necessary, it must be
invalidated. The government's only legitimate interests in ex-
cluding aliens relate to the health, safety, and welfare of the
country. Protecting the government from criticism is not a
legitimate interest, even if such criticism at times strains our
relation with other countries. Protecting criticism of govern-
ment is one of the primary purposes of the first amendment.3 7
Other Supreme Court cases demonstrate that the govern-
ment's interests in foreign relations, national security, and the
power to exclude aliens are not a priori compelling and must
be balanced against encroachments on first amendment
rights.33 8 Instead of being narrowly tailored, the exclusionary
provisions of the McCarran-Walter Act are vague, overbroad,
and content-based. Further, they leave no adequate alterna-
tive modes for the receipt of the desired communications and
are implemented by a method amounting to administrative
licensing.
Numerous legal scholars and the popular press have ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with ideological exclusions. Congres-
sional displeasure with the Act brought on the passage of
section 901 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act which,
with the recent two-year extension, prevents ideological exclu-
sions through December of 1990.33' The law requires that "no
alien may be denied a visa or excluded from admission ...
because of any past, current, or expected beliefs, statements,
or associations which, if engaged in by a United States citizen
... would be protected under the Constitution... ,40 Using
this standard is preferable to the Supreme Court's "legitimate
and bona fide" standard which ignores citizens' rights and
shows unnecessary deference to the government. The current
suspension of ideological exclusions may be allowed to expire
or future laws may be enacted that restrict entry into the
337. Id at 723-24 (Douglas, J., concurring).
338. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Perez v. Brownell,
356 U.S. 44 (1958); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889).
339. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, as
amended, Pub. L. No. 100-461, § 555, 102 Stats. 2268-36, -37 (1988).
340. Id
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United States on account of beliefs, statements, or associations.
If either occurs, the policy of curtailment of executive discre-
tion found in the Moynihan-Frank amendment should be in-
corporated into future uses of the Kleindienst v. Mandel bona
fide and legitimate test. This will provide a needed check on
government interference with the right to receive information
and ideas from visiting foreigners. Use of this standard would
allow the government to pursue legitimate objectives involv-
ing border control, national security, and foreign relations
without sacrificing vital first amendment freedoms in the
process.

